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The concepts “autistic traits” and “broader autism phenotype” are not officially recognised by the 
diagnostic authorities. However, some clinicians and others regard the broader autism phenotype as a 
sub-clinical presentation of behaviours or traits qualitatively similar to features associated with 
autism, often referred to as “autistic traits.”  
 
In this research, the origin of the broader autism phenotype concept is considered, the theoretical 
perspectives on autism and “autistic traits” are briefly reviewed and compared, the statement sets in 
four instruments used for identifying so-called “autistic traits” are analysed, and the justifications for a 
broader autism phenotype are reviewed.  
 
The researcher concludes that the concept of “autistic traits” arises from a misuse of language, that the 
absence of autistic traits indicates that there is no such thing as a “broader autism phenotype,” and that 
apparent evidence for the existence of a broader phenotype is more likely evidence for the population 
of autistic people being larger than suspected.  
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Introduction 
According to the medical model of disability, autism is a spectrum disorder involving delays in social 
interaction, social communication and social imagination (Wing and Gould, 1979). The diagnostic 
criteria in the current fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-5; APA, 2013) and 
the eleventh edition of the International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health 
Problems (ICD-11; WHO, 2018) also include restricted and repetitive patterns of behaviour;. The 
DSM-5 reintroduces sensory issues as a potential additive diagnostic criterion for autism, and the 
ICD-11 followed suit. High levels of anxiety are also very often associated with autism (Kerns and 
Kendall, 2012; Kerns et al., 2014; Strang et al., 2012) arguably due to autistic people living in a 
neurotypical world that is very often unfriendly to them (Beardon, 2017)
i
. Asperger syndrome (AS) is 
a DSM-IV diagnosis on the autism spectrum that has been absorbed into the over-arching diagnosis of 
autism spectrum disorder in the DSM-5. In this article the term “autism” covers all extant autism 
diagnoses
ii
.    
 
From a social model perspective, many of the difficulties associated with autism can be regarded as 
having a societal cause, rather than being the “fault” of the individual as with the medical model. With 
the social model, the term “disability” is reserved for matters resulting from adverse attitudes towards 
autistic people and barriers placed in their way by society. As an acknowledgement that not all aspects 
of disability have a societal cause, Carol Thomas (2004) developed the concept of “impairment 
effects” to cover aspects of disability that directly arise from the inherent difficulties associated with 
impairment. Other scholars consider that the difficulties in autism are due to a mix of biological, 
psychological and social (societal) causes, and subscribe to a biopsychosocial model, such as that 
adopted by the World Health Organization (Rosenbaum and Stewart, 2004). Proponents of 
neurodiversity regard autism as cognitive and sensory difference rather than impairment, disability or 
disorder (Kapp et al., 2013; Milton, 2015). Indeed, there has been a recent call – endorsed by 25 
autistic
iii
 and non-autistic scholars – for autism to be removed from the existing diagnostic manuals 
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and included in a proposed new manual of neurodivergent needs (Chown and Leatherland, 2018)
iv
. 
This reflects their view that the difficulties many autistic people experience have a societal cause.  
 
The study reported here involved the content analysis
v
 of various autism screening tools consisting of 
lists of questions or statements designed to identify so-called “autistic traits” and thereby evaluate the 
likelihood that an individual being screened is autistic. The researcher has looked at these screening 
tools through a medical model lens deliberately, because “autistic traits” and the “broader autism 
phenotype” are medical model constructs. Extensive statistical testing of these tools demonstrates that 
this approach to screening works (Sappok, Heinrich and Underwood, 2015; Schanding, Nowell and 
Goin-Kochel, 2012), although of course most of the tests could be improved. For instance, Charman 
and Gotham (2013) point out that screening tools cope less well with the very marginal cases where 
clinicians most need diagnostic help. Gould and Ashton-Smith (2011), amongst others, have drawn 
attention to the difficulty girls and women often face in obtaining a diagnosis of autism, pointing out 
that different presentation in females has implications for the instruments used in the diagnostic 
process. Many autism screening tools, including the tools reviewed, appear to have a mix of age, 
cultural, gender and racial biases. Screening tools could be improved by (a) reflecting generic aspects 
of the lived experience of autism as described by autistic people themselves, and (b) by developing 
variants that reflect age, cultural, gender and racial differences. Detailed discussion of the fitness for 
purpose of the screening tools analysed, or of the inherent fitness for purpose of any questionnaire-
based tools, deserves separate consideration. In this paper, the researcher has only sought to determine 
whether listed traits are “autistic traits.” Although the underlying efficacy of the tools is not in dispute 
here, there is evidence that they work not because their originators have identified “autistic traits,” but 
because of a clustering effect, as will be further discussed.      
 
Many authors refer to “autistic traits,” to a “broader autism phenotype,” or in some cases to both 
concepts (e.g., Bora et al., 2017; Ozonoff et al., 2014; Wheelwright et al., 2010), although as noted, 
neither are officially recognised in the DSM-V or ICD-11 (APA, 2013; WHO, 2018). These concepts 
are connected, because there is supposed to be a wider phenotype, including individuals with “autistic 
traits” who would not receive a diagnosis of autism (Bora et al., 2017; Landry and Chouinard, 2016; 
Bishop and Seltzer, 2012). Those people in the broader autism phenotype who do not fit the 
diagnostic criteria for autism would presumably not be considered autistic. But there are those who 
question the ability of any of the diagnostic criteria developed to date to identify all autistic people 
(Beardon, 2018; Hughes, 2015). It is therefore premature to work on the assumption that those who do 
not apparently meet the criteria are not autistic.  
 
One especially important area relates to a doubt as to the ability of the criteria to encompass female 
and ethnic minority presentations of autism. For instance, Liz Hughes (2015) has described the extent 
of the difficulties autistic women have faced in getting their diagnosis, listing 30 alternative diagnoses 
received by the women who responded to her survey prior to each being diagnosed as autistic, and a 




The author’s own research has only uncovered one attempt – by Dawson et al. (2002) – at defining 
“autistic traits.”
vi
 The vast majority of articles that refer to the term apparently do so on the 
assumption that it will be understood without explanation (for example, Constantino, 2011; Hasegawa 
et al., 2015). Those authors who refer to specifically “autistic traits” appear to assume that such traits 
do exist and that this assumption is non-controversial. The validity of vague terms that have not been 
the subject of vigorous debate is not enhanced by their constant repetition. So-called evidence cannot 
be valid if it involves dubious, unproven terminology.         
 
Scholars working in the field of autism understand the term “autistic traits” because, as Ludwig 
Wittgenstein showed us (Wittgenstein, 1958), people learn how to use language in social contexts so 
that they can understand each other even when terms lack clear definition. The danger here is that we 
all “understand” what we mean, and so fail to realise that we may be reifying an idea. The author has 
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even found examples of work by autistic scholars referring to “autistic traits,” which I think indicate 
immersion in this language game rather than expression of a view on the existence of such traits. For 
instance, Damian Milton does not usually refer to “autistic traits,” but referred to their amelioration 
when writing of the “pressure on autistic people to conform and to internalise a deficit model of their 
own selves” (Milton, 2016). At least one scholar has questioned the validity of the concept of autistic 
traits, with Luke Beardon (2017: p. 65) having written that “there is no such thing as ‘autistic 
behaviour.’ In other words, there is no single behaviour or set of behaviours displayed by the autistic 
person that can’t be seen in [non-autistic people].” One simple question should be enough to make 
one have second thoughts about the term “autistic traits”: “If there are traits unique to autism, why is 
it often so difficult to diagnose?”  
 
Six candidate autistic traits have been proposed (Dawson et al., 2002): (a) [deficits in] face 
processing, including eye gaze; (b) [deficits in] social motivation; (c) [deficits in] motor imitation 
ability, especially imitation of body actions; (d) [deficits or differences in] memory, specifically that 
which is mediated by the medial temporal lobe–prefrontal circuits; (e) [deficits in] executive function, 
particularly planning and flexibility; and (f) [deficits or differences in] language ability, particularly 
those aspects of language that overlap with specific language impairment. Attempts have also been 
made to describe autistic traits using various screening instruments, such as the Autism Spectrum 
Quotient (AQ; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001), the Social Responsiveness Scale (SRS; Constantino, 2002), 
the Social Communication Questionnaire (SCQ; Rutter, Bailey and Lord, 2003
vii
) and the Broad 
Autism Phenotype Questionnaire (BAPQ; Hurley et al., 2007).  
 
The traits proposed by Dawson et al. – such as deficits in executive function and social motivation – 
are supposed deficits in autism, and not associated with neurotypicality without any co-morbid 
pathology. So when Wheelwright et al. (2010) write that autistic traits are distributed amongst the 
general population, it is likely that they refer to the trait descriptions in the AQ developed by Simon 
Baron-Cohen’s team. If this was not the case, the implication would be that the executive function 
difficulties and (lack of/reduced) social motivation supposedly associated with autism are also 
observed in the neurotypical population. There appears to be no unambiguous definition of “autistic 
traits,” which should be a requirement for valid conclusions to be drawn about a supposed wider 
spread of these traits amongst the general population.  
 
Although the concept of autistic traits does not enable easy diagnosis of autism, as it should if traits 
are unique to autism, it forms the basis for the so-called broader phenotype. There have been many 
reports of autistic traits in the general population (e.g., Ingersoll et al., 2011; Sucksmith, Roth and 
Hoekstra, 2011). However, all these studies do is evidence that the same traits can be found in 
individuals both with and without a diagnosis of autism (which is what one would expect of human 
traits), and that these traits are often found in relatives of autistic individuals (which could just as 
easily imply further autism in these families than a broader phenotype). Jaswal and Akhtar (2019, p. 
31) point out in their study of social motivation in autism that “most of the unusual behaviors 
documented in autism have also been documented among non-autistic children and adults … When 
non-autistics engage in these behaviors, they are not attributed to deficits … to the contrary, they are 
often considered to be adaptive responses to a particular situation.” Jaswal and Akhtar consider, as 
does the author, that many behaviours are adaptive responses for autistic people too, but generally 
interpreted as pathological because they do not fit the majority behavioural pattern.  
 
There is also a hypothesis that autistic traits are an aspect of personality distributed amongst the 
general population. Austin (2005: p. 452) considers that the “Big Five”
viii
 model of personality can 
explain the personality characteristics of the broader autism phenotype. Wakabayashi, Baron-Cohen 
and Wheelwright (2006) suggest that autistic traits are independent of the five-factor model 
dimensions, arguing that autistic traits represent a sixth personality factor. A link between autism and 
personality disorders has been proposed by Lugnegård, Hallerbäck and Gillberg (2012). However, the 
author argues for a clear distinction between autism, personality traits and personality disorders. 
Following the likes of Happé and Frith (2006), Mottron et al. (2006) and Murray, Lesser and Lawson 
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(2005), this means regarding autism as cognitive and perceptual difference, not an aspect of 




Autistic perspectives on “autistic traits” 
The researcher asked members of a secret Facebook group
x
 of autistic autism researchers (with 120 
members) what they think of the “autistic traits” concept. Twenty responses were received. Key 
points raised by respondents included the following (some are extracts in view of space restrictions). 
All respondents have been anonymised except for two who asked to be named. 
 
Table 1: Some responses to  survey of autistic autism researchers (r=20) 
Key point Comment 
Lack of definitions 
of psychological 
terms 
“I'd say, don't assume the word ‘trait’ means the same thing to all people. 
My consistent frustration with psychologists is that they don't define their 
terms, and assume we are all using a word the same way.”   
A misleading but 
useful concept 
“I think it's a useful but misleading concept. Yes, 'autistic traits' in the sense 
you define probably don't exist, or barely, in the same way that as Beardon 
says, there's no such thing as 'autistic behaviours'... Maybe 'autistic traits' 
isn't the right term for them, but I do think there's something to be salvaged 
there. There's potential for talk in terms of traits or tendencies to counteract 
this, at least a bit.” 
Different discourses 
relating to autistic 
traits 
“It just struck me: there are different discourses of autistic traits. There is a 
dominating medical one which is being used to formally define/diagnose 
people as autistic. There are different ‘lay’ or ‘community’ discourses who 
may or may not overlap. There are constant epistemic battles between in 
within communities - what to include or not as ‘autistic traits.’ So it is a 
matter of who and where "autistic traits" are being debated.” 
No such thing as 
“autistic traits” in 




, I'd say there's no such thing as autistic traits, or 
autism traits. They don't exist. I don't think there are any universal traits of 
the type you describe. There's no such thing as an action that's unique to 
autism. It doesn't exist. Everyone stims, but we only call it that and 
pathologize it when certain ND [neurodiverse] people do it.” 
(Alyssa Hillary, University of Rhode Island) 
Inhabiting the 
intersection between 
the real world and 
the ideological world 
“It is question again of medical vs phenomenological or other model. I do 
not think ‘traits’ is a bad word in itself but it is prone to abuse in either 
direction. I inhabit an intersection between the pragmatic world of survival 
as neurobiologically atypical, and the ideological world where I would be 
free to be as I am without impediment.”  
Autistic traits as 
“family 
resemblances”    
“I take it they mean something more along the lines of Wittgensteinian 
family resemblance features than necessary and sufficient conditions.” 
An “autistic flavour” 
to the behaviours of 
autistic people 
“Hans Asperger wrote of an ‘autistic flavour’ to the behaviours of autistic 
people. He didn’t reduce it to a specific set of behaviours.” 
Universal 
experiences of 
autism, not universal 
traits 
“…we do think about experiences which are universal. Things like the 
double empathy problem. Things like Yergeau's demirhetoricity. These 
experiences are truly universal for us, including among nonspeaking 
autistic people and autistic people with I/DD labels. Like you will not find 
universal traits. The trait level is too fine. We are people.” 
(Rua Mae Williams, University of Florida) 
Insufficient traits 
displayed at time of 
assessment to be 
autistic (italics 
added) 
“When my son went through the assessment process first time round his 
report read ‘exhibits several autistic traits but not significantly impaired 
enough to warrant a diagnosis’ - so in that medical scenario ‘traits’ were 
understood to be behaviours associated with the diagnostic criteria 
(bollocks that that is) which have to be numerous and ‘impairing’ enough 
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to impact significantly - or else you are not autistic...yeah right.” 
 
Other respondents simply agreed with the position that there are no unique “autistic traits” as defined 
by autistic people, although there are certain universal experiences in autism. It is important also to 
acknowledge environmental effects. In relation to what he calls the “golden equation” (AUTISM + 
ENVIRONMENT = OUTCOME), Beardon (2019) writes that autism impacts each individual 
differently and is dependent on the nature of the environment they are in at any particular time. For 
example, the son of the last quoted respondent in Table 1 eventually received a diagnosis of autism 
despite previously being told by a clinician that he was “not significantly impaired enough to warrant 
a diagnosis,” because he did not display sufficient traits in the assessment session to be autistic.  
 
Broader Autism Phenotype 
The concept of a broader phenotype of autism has been said to derive from observations made by the 
two clinicians who identified autism all those years ago, Hans Asperger and Leo Kanner. Both 
Asperger and Kanner reported behavioural features in the parents of the children they had seen in 
their clinics that were similar in kind to those of their autistic children (Sucksmith et al., 2011). 
Sucksmith et al. (ibid.: pp. 4-5) write that “thus from a very early period, observations suggested that 
the expression of autistic traits extends beyond the clinical boundaries of autism to include a mild 
subthreshold expression in relatives.” As many autistic people say, autism can only appear “mild” to 
those who are not autistic. From a scholarly perspective, let me quote Beardon (2017: p. 11) who, 
with acknowledged sarcasm, writes of “the dreaded ‘mild autism’? Being just a teeny bit autistic? 
Hardly autistic at all? Just having a cheeky splash of autism?” Being “higher functioning” 
intellectually may actually increase the anxiety and stress of being autistic in a neurotypical world due 
to greater understanding. It is the author’s view that the so-called “mild subthreshold expression” is 
actually a reflection of a higher prevalence of autism.  
 
It is ironic that a belief in the existence of a broader phenotype depends on “autistic traits” being 
normally distributed amongst human beings, when these very same traits are why autism is 
pathologised. The definition of “autistic traits” put forward by Dawson and her colleagues (Dawson et 
al., 2002) refers to matters that would presumably not be generally accepted as being normally 
distributed amongst the general population
xii
. And, by definition, traits observed in the neurotypical 
population cannot be “autistic traits” if by that is meant uniquely autistic behaviour. There appears to 
be a fundamental failure of logic in regarding trait X as an aspect of pathology in autism but not as 
pathological in the general population. Or is that some scholars of autism regard autistic traits in the 
general population as being a small amount of pathology within that population? If this is the case, 
one has to ask how much pathology is “allowed” before neurotypicality becomes autism? It can be 
argued, and is argued by proponents of neurodiversity, that “difference” is part of the human 
condition. So a confused muddling of natural difference and pathology may be at work here. The 
point is that a trait cannot be “pathology” in autism and other neurological conditions but “difference” 
in all other human beings. As some traits seen in the general population are qualitatively and/or 
quantitatively different in autism, there only appears to be a broader autism phenotype. This is a 
chimera arising from a category mistake relating to the concept of so-called “autistic traits.” 
 
The term “broader autism phenotype” is applied to individuals with behavioural and cognitive traits 
similar to but supposedly milder than those observed in autism (Miles, 2011). For example, Sucksmith 
et al. (2011: p. 360) describe the broader phenotype by pointing out that “genetic relatives of people 
with autism often show milder expression of traits characteristic for autism.” Bishop et al. (2004: p. 
1431) also stress the aspect of “mildness” in relation to the broader autism phenotype when writing 
that “the concept of the ‘broad phenotype’ of autism refers to the finding that relatives of autistic 
people often have mild forms of autistic-like characteristics, such as social and communicative 
difficulties.” Wheelwright et al. (2010) state that the broader autism phenotype is qualitatively similar 
to but milder than the diagnosed autism phenotype. They also write that the milder characteristics of 
the broader phenotype were first described by Leo Kanner (1943). The researcher’s own analysis of 
the parents referred to by Kanner in his original paper whom Wheelwright and her colleagues are 
likely to be referring to leads us to conclude that his descriptions are just as likely to be of autism than 
51 
 
of some apparently “mild” manifestation of so-called autistic traits that do not justify a diagnosis of 
autism.  
 
Donald Grey Triplett (Donald T.) 
Donald T. was Leo Kanner’s first case study in the seminal 1943 paper on what we now call autism. 
Donald had been institutionalised by his parents, but at Kanner’s urging was outplaced with a foster 
family, eventually returned home, and ended up having a positive outcome – college, employment and 
an active social/community life – given the time period. Kanner (1943: pp. 218-219) wrote the 
following about Donald’s father:  
 
“The father, whom Donald resembles physically, is a successful, meticulous, hard-working 
lawyer who has had two ‘breakdowns’ under strain of work. He always took every ailment 
seriously, taking to his bed and following doctors’ orders punctiliously even for the slightest 
cold. When he walks down the street, he is so absorbed in thinking that he sees nothing and 
nobody and cannot remember anything about his walk”   
 
It has been argued that being meticulous and hard-working are human traits often seen in autistic 
people that make them excellent employees, as long as suitable reasonable adjustments are made 
where necessary (Beardon, 2019). Beardon (ibid.: p. 92) provides the following case study: 
 
“Bob is a very serious, goal-oriented autistic employee who has a high degree of focus within 
his work and is attending a team meeting, for which he has been responsible for drawing up 
an agenda. As usual, Bob has meticulously emailed all those invited to the meeting to ask for 
their agenda items, and has calculated to the minute how long each item needs.” 
 
There is a reported tendency for autistic people to be strict rule-followers which could explain the 
father’s apparently excessively strict compliance with doctors’ orders, and the meticulousness of the 
autistic employee in seeking agenda items. The absorption in thinking to the extent that nothing else 
penetrates the intense thinking state of Donald T.’s father, and the high degree of focus of the autistic 
employee, can be explained by the monotropism theory of autism, which proposes that autism 
involves a narrow field of attention in comparison to the typical wider attention generally seen in 
human beings (Murray, Lesser and Lawson, 2005). Although the gap between Kanner’s article and 
Beardon’s book is more than 75 years, the similarities between them are clear to see. 
 
One has to ask why Kanner’s comments about Donald’s father are “personality quirks,” while the 
son’s traits are pathological? Is this distinction based on cultural assumptions from the time period: 
e.g., if Donald’s father is a reliable breadwinner, could that have been enough to make him “not 
pathological” in the 1930s/40s—and would it be enough now? Or was it Kanner’s assumption that 
Donald could only meet his criteria of “normalcy” with the right intervention that made his 
behaviours appear pathological rather than just unusual?  
Autism screening tools and autistic traits 
The investigation of autistic traits reported on here covers three of the four instruments included in the 
comparison of broader autism phenotype self-report screening tools undertaken by Ingersoll (2011) 
and her colleagues, i.e., the AQ, BAPQ, and SRS. The SCQ was excluded from the detailed review 
for  reasons that will be explained. These tools seek to screen for autism by identifying behaviours the 
authors of the instruments associate with autism. The significant differences between the behaviour 
sets in the four tools is indicative of a lack of consensus on what behaviours are supposed to be 
“autistic.”  
 
The AQ self-report questionnaire covers social interaction/ communication (e.g., “I find social 
situations easy” and “other people frequently tell me that what I’ve said is impolite, even though I 
think it is polite”), repetitive behaviours (e.g., “I prefer to do things the same way over and over 
again”), special interests (e.g., “I tend to have very strong interests which I get upset about if I can’t 
pursue”) and sensory sensitivities (e.g., “I often notice small sounds when others do not”). In addition, 
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the AQ includes statements on related areas, such as difficulty with/lack of interest in reading fiction, 
making friends and changes to routines.  
 
Unlike the AQ, the SRS is an instrument focused solely on the social aspects of autism, and has to be 
administered by a professional, with the statements rated by a parent, caregiver or teacher rather than 
the individual himself or herself. The SRS also differs from the AQ in seeking to provide a continuous 
measure of social ability instead of an indication of autism.  
 
The SCQ is a parent-report screening measure that supposedly “taps the symptomatology associated 
with autism spectrum disorder” (Rutter, Bailey and Lord, 2003). Despite its title, the SCQ covers 
social interaction, social communication and repetitive behaviours but, unlike the AQ, it does not 
include sensory sensitivities. Whilst the SCQ provides a cut-off score, with the AQ a score of 32 or 
more is simply a strong indicator of autism: scores of <32 may be false negatives and scores of >32 
may be false positives (Baron-Cohen et al., 2006).  
 
The BAPQ was designed to identify individuals within the broader phenotype on the basis of a set of 
personality and language traits (aloofness, difficulties with pragmatic language and rigidity). This 
instrument has been said to have “demonstrated convergent validity with direct clinical assessment of 
the broader autism phenotype using interview, clinical assessment, informant report and consensus 
ratings by trained raters” (Ingersoll et al., 2011, p. 1647).  
 
The AQ, BAPQ, SCQ and SRS have been the subject of statistical testing that support their use in 
screening for autism (e.g. Baron-Cohen et al., 2001 in relation to the AQ). The tools in this context 
may be useful, but there is no evidence that the efficacy of these tools as demonstrated by the test 
results is evidence in support of the existence of a broader autism phenotype. It could equally be 
evidence that the autistic population is significantly larger than is generally thought to be the case. No 
study was located that reports analysis of the individual traits embedded within these screening tools 
to determine if there are real “autistic traits” or simply human traits, some of which are associated 
more with autism than with the general population. The effectiveness of any self-report tool also 
depends on the ability of the person completing it to be self-reflective. Although self-awareness in 
autism can be an issue, the fact that these tools appear to work effectively suggests that it is not a 
major issue in this context. The results obtained from self-report screening tools will also reflect the 
extent to which the individual lives in an autism-friendly or autism-unfriendly environment
xiii
.    
 
“Autistic traits” as measured by the Autism Spectrum Quotient 
Baron-Cohen et al. (2001: p. 6) wrote of the need for “a short, self-administered scale for identifying 
the degree to which any individual adult of normal IQ may have ‘autistic traits’ or what has been 
called ‘the broader phenotype’ … This would be useful for both scientific reasons (e.g., establishing 
who is ‘affected’ and who is not, or the degree of caseness of an individual, in scientific 
comparisons), and potentially for applied reasons (e.g., screening for possibly affected individuals to 
assist in making referrals for a full diagnostic assessment).” The Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ) was 
developed for these reasons. Items for the AQ were chosen from the domains in the “triad of 
impairments” (Wing and Gould, 1979), and from “areas of cognitive abnormality in autism.”  
 
The AQ consists of 50 statements designed to screen for autism. The statements are focused on five 
different areas of functioning: attention to detail, attention switching, communication, imagination 
and social skills (Austin, 2005). The individual completing the AQ has to state whether they 
“definitely agree,” “slightly agree,” “slightly disagree,” or “definitely disagree” with each statement: a 
four-point Likert scale that eliminates an equivocal answer. Each response is scored, and an overall 
score of 32 or above is said to indicate that a person may be autistic, pointing in the direction of 
obtaining a formal diagnosis if an individual wishes to know for certain. As with any tool of this 
nature, there is a risk of false negatives and false positives; however, the AQ is used regularly for 






 statements that the author considers to capture behaviours and preferences often (but not 
always) associated with autism are presented in Table 2 in bold type: these are either statements that 
relate to so-called “autistic traits,” where the expected response if autism is present is agreement, or 
where the expected response is disagreement because the trait is the “opposite” of the expected 
response in autism. Statements relating to matters that are too often seen in the neurotypical 
population to be in any way indicative of autism (e.g., whilst a small number of autistic individuals 
are fascinated by dates, many neurotypical people are difficult to prise away from social media) are in 
ordinary type. The author argues that none of the statements – including those in bold type – can be 
taken as supporting a case for a broader autism phenotype, because all the behaviours/traits included 
in this tool can be seen in the neurotypical population, as well as in conditions such as anxiety 
disorders, depression, obsessive-compulsive disorder and attachment disorders—all of which can co-
exist with autism, and indeed all of which are diagnosed in non-autistic people. The next paragraph 
provides one example of what is meant by so-called “autistic traits” also being seen in the majority 
population.  
 
Item number 28 of the AQ – “I usually concentrate on the whole picture, rather than the small details” 
– is  presumably a reflection of the original version of central coherence theory (Frith and Happé, 
1994), which proposed that autistic people are good with details but have difficulty getting the gist of 
a situation. So the designers of the AQ presumably sought to use a negative response to this statement 
as one potential indication that the person completing the tool is autistic. The later version of central 
coherence theory (Happé and Frith, 2006) argued that a detail-focused processing style is a cognitive 
preference in autism, not a weakness. There is no evidence that a detail-focused cognitive style is 
unknown in neurotypical populations; likewise, autistic individuals exist who are strong with detail 
and excellent strategic thinkers, eminently capable of seeing the “big picture.” Whilst a negative 
response to this statement can be included in a cluster of indications of autism, such a response is not 
a reflection of an “autistic trait.” If there is both autism and a broader phenotype, one would expect to 
see some measure of what supposedly divides these two categories, e.g. severity or impact. But how 
specific and reliable are any of the tests at measuring severity/impact? For example, no test includes 
the impact of environment on expression of traits, which is a crucial factor (Beardon, 2019). 
     
Table 2: Examples of statements from the Autism Spectrum Quotient 
28. I usually concentrate more on the whole picture, rather than the small details. 
29. I am not very good at remembering phone numbers. 
30. I don’t usually notice small changes in a situation, or a person’s appearance. 
31. I know how to tell if someone listening to me is getting bored. 
32. I find it easy to do more than one thing at once. 
33. When I talk on the phone, I’m not sure when it’s my turn to speak. 
34. I enjoy doing things spontaneously.  
35. I am often the last to understand the point of a joke. 
 
Autistic traits as measured by the Broad Autism Phenotype Questionnaire 
The Broad Autism Phenotype Questionnaire (BAPQ) was designed to measure the broader autism 
phenotype in adults. The authors regard the broader phenotype as “a set of personality and language 
characteristics that reflect the phenotypic expression of the genetic liability to autism, in non-autistic 
relatives of autistic individuals. These characteristics are milder but qualitatively similar to the 
defining features of autism” (Hurley et al., 2007: p. 1679).   
 
The BAPQ includes 36 statements designed to evaluate the factors of aloofness, rigidity and 
pragmatic language difficulties
xv
. Each statement needs to be rated on a six-point scale between “very 
rarely” and “very often.” In their study of the application of the BAPQ to 86 parents of autistic 
children and 64 control parents, Hurley and his colleagues instructed participants about to complete 
the questionnaire to consider their behaviour during the majority of their adult life rather than at 
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specific times, and consider interactions in general rather than special relationships. The sets of AQ 
and BAPQ statements are very similar, although some BAPQ statements are autism-unfriendly (e.g., 
‘I am “in-tune” with the other person during conversation’; ‘I have to warm myself up to the idea of 
visiting an unfamiliar place’; and ‘People get frustrated by my unwillingness to bend’ [author’s 
italics]). There is not space here to discuss the correct approach to language use in these tools in 
depth
xvi
. However, autistic people may have difficulty with some aspects of language pragmatics. 
Some autistic children are delayed in their use of language, and that delay may have a continuing 
effect into adulthood in certain respects. This can be reflected in an extreme literalness in their use of 
language, and difficulty with ambiguous and metaphoric language. The general advice is to avoid 
using irony, sarcasm, figurative language, rhetorical questions, idioms, or exaggeration. Whilst many 
autistic people will not have difficulty with “in-tune,” “warm myself up,” or “unwillingness to bend,” 
some may wonder why they are being asked about a musical instrument, being cold, or not wishing to 
lean over something. It is surprising that autism researchers are unaware of readily available advice of 
this nature. The use of bold type and ordinary type here mirrors their usage in relation to the AQ. 
And, as with the AQ, all the behaviours/traits can be seen in the neurotypical population as well as in 
autism.  
 
Item number 23 from the BAPQ, “I am good at making small talk,” is presumably included to screen 
out people who answer in the negative, because a tendency to be poor at small talk is associated with 
autism. Small talk can indeed be a difficulty in autism, especially during the formative years. As one 
of a cluster of indications of autism, it is a justifiable inclusion within this screening tool. But there 
are many autistic people who are excellent at small talk and neurotypical individuals who are not 
good at it, so it is hard to conceptualise it as an “autistic trait.”  
 
Table 3: Examples of statements from the Broader Autism Phenotype Questionnaire 
19. I look forward to trying new things  
20. I speak too loudly or softly  
21. I can tell when someone is not interested in what I am saying 
22. I have a hard time dealing with changes in my routine  
23. I am good at making small talk  
24. I act very set in my ways  
25. I feel like I am really connecting with other people  
26. People get frustrated by my unwillingness to bend 
 
“Autistic traits” as measured by the Social Responsiveness Scale questionnaire 
The third measure of autistic traits to be analysed is the Social Responsiveness Scale questionnaire 
(SRS; Constantino, 2002). Constantino et al. (2003: p. 427) write that “studies of the broader autism 
phenotype, and of subtle changes in autism symptoms over time, have been compromised by a lack of 
established quantitative assessment tools. The Social Responsiveness Scale … is a new instrument 
that can be completed by parents and/or teachers in 15–20 minutes.” The SRS prioritises evaluation of 
“a child’s ability to engage in emotionally appropriate reciprocal social interactions” (ibid., p. 428). 
Other aspects of autism are measured in relation to impairment of normal reciprocal social behaviour. 
 
The 65 statements in the SRS are rated on a four-point scale: “Not True,” “Sometimes True,” “Often 
True” and “Almost Always True.” Due to copyright restrictions none of the statements can be include 
here. However, following the same pattern of analysis used for the AQ and BAPQ above, it was 
concluded that the statements can again be divided between those considered indicative of autism 
(either as written or as their opposite), and those that relate to personality, which could apply (either 
as written or amended) to neurotypical people as well as to autistic individuals.     
 
“Autistic traits” as measured by the Social Communication Questionnaire 
The fourth measure of autistic traits analysed is the Social Communication Questionnaire (SCS; 
Rutter, Bailey and Lord, 2003). Rutter and his colleagues write that the SCQ was originally designed 
as a companion to the Autism Diagnostic Interview-Revised (ADI-R), which provides an individual’s 
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developmental history relevant to autism, and that “the SCQ items were deliberately chosen to match 
the ADI-R items that were found to have discriminative diagnostic validity” (ibid.: p. 1).  
 
There are 40 items in this parent-report questionnaire, each requiring a “yes” or “no” response. As 
with the AQ, an individual’s score above or below a cut-off score provides an indication as to whether 
an individual is likely to be autistic. The SCQ is described as being suitable for all autistic individuals 
above four years of age, as long as their mental age exceeds two years. It is difficult to see how a 
questionnaire can be suitable for children as defined and adults, although presumably the authors 
would only recommend its use with adults with a very severe comorbid intellectual disability
xvii
. This 
is a quite different instrument from the AQ, BAPQ and SRS designed to screen for autism in very 
young children. In view of the unsatisfactory response from the organisation responsible for the SCQ 
regarding the age issue, the SCQ has been excluded from the review. 
 
Discussion. 
The authors of the three reviewed screening instruments appear to have taken for granted the 
existence of a broader autism phenotype and taken steps to develop a means of measuring it. 
However, no explanation as to how the statements/questions in the screening instruments were 
actually developed have been located, only opinions as to the validity of the instruments following 
testing. 
 
The fact that screening tool questions/statements apply in some form to both autistic and non-autistic 
individuals is not inconsistent with the existence of a broader phenotype. However, this situation 
could also indicate a wider prevalence of autism than is generally understood to be the case. To 
summarise the key points presented above: 
 
(a) Some behaviours/traits are associated with autism, although it is doubtful that any are specific 
to autism (behaviours/traits specific to autism are theoretically possible but the researcher has 
not yet identified any traits or behaviours captured by questions/statements on the three tests 
analysed that are absolutely unique to autism); 
 
(b) However, if it is accepted that some behaviours/traits are specific to autism, they then could 
not, by definition, apply to the neurotypical population—and hence could not be taken as 
supporting a spectrum of “autistic traits” in the general population;  
 
(c) If some behaviours/traits are specific to autism, it should not be difficult to diagnose autism, 
as a clinician would simply need to look for these traits;  
 
(d) If a behaviour/trait is seen in both the autistic and neurotypical populations, further evidence 
would be needed before one could reliably conclude that it implied a spectrum of “autistic 
traits” in the general population rather than behaviour/trait commonality across all human 
neurotypes. 
 
These statements suggest that the screening tools analysed here do not currently support the existence 
of a broader autism phenotype based on a spectrum of “autistic traits” across the general population. 
 
In practice, the term “broader autism phenotype” is applied to individuals with behavioural and 
cognitive traits similar to but supposedly milder than those observed in autism, and which are said to 
be continuously distributed throughout the general population. It has been said that broader autism 
phenotype characteristics were first observed by Leo Kanner. The researcher’s analysis
xviii
 of all the 
parents referred to by Kanner in his original paper who could be regarded as examples of a broader 
autism phenotype, is that the descriptions are just as likely to be of autism than of some apparently 
“mild” manifestation of so-called autistic traits that do not justify a diagnosis of autism. In fact, the 
researcher finds it just as easy to believe that a Kanner patient parent such as the father of Donald T. 
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was himself autistic. Of course, there is no proof of this, but then neither is there any proof that 
Kanner unknowingly recorded characteristics of a broader autism phenotype
xix
. It is not necessary to 
dispute that traits associated with autism are seen in relatives of those diagnosed with autism, but the 
researcher’s perspective on this is that human traits, albeit sometimes expressed in a qualitatively 
and/or quantitatively different way, are observed in the general population as well as in autism. The 
researcher therefore does not assume that there is a broader autism phenotype consisting of 
individuals with too few characteristics of autism to actually be autistic, i.e., to meet diagnostic 
criteria for autism, and instead hypothesises that the current diagnostic criteria are not sensitive 
enough to identify all individuals who are autistic. This is no less likely to be correct than are the 
proponents of a broader autism phenotype to be correct. Evaluation of behavioural traits alone cannot 
be sufficient to determine with absolute certainty whether or not someone is autistic. A full clinical 
review would be required to be reasonably sure
xx
. Ideally, individuals should be assessed in a variety 
of different environments. 
 
Is there a boundary between an individual being autistic and not being autistic depending on how 
many “autistic traits” they have or how severe such traits appear to be? Nobody knows of course, but 
the associated concepts of “autistic traits,” and a “broader phenotype” of people with “autistic traits” 
that are not enough in terms of number/severity for the individual to actually be autistic, do not appear 
to be supported by clear evidence. The researcher’s view is that an individual is either autistic or they 
are not, and that the dividing line between these states does not depend on the sum of so-called 
“autistic traits.” It is therefore likely that many undiagnosed family members of diagnosed individuals 
are also autistic.  
 
Finally, the researcher would like to challenge researchers to respond to the following questions:    
 
 What evidence (if any) is there for the existence of traits specific to autism that can justify the 
use of the term “autistic traits”? 
 
 Is it possible to be a “little” autistic or is there a definite boundary between autism and 
neurotypicality? 
 
 If there is no definite boundary between autism and neurotypicality, what makes the 
difference between being in a broader phenotype and justifying a diagnosis? 
 
 If there is a definite boundary between autism and neurotypicality, what causes a person to 
“jump the gap” from insufficient traits to a diagnosis?  
 
 Taking the answers to the four questions above into account, does the concept of a broader 
autism phenotype seem more or less valid? 
 
Conclusion 
There are traits that when clustered together provide an indication of autism. But evidence suggests 
that these are a cluster of human traits, not traits unique to autism. No traits unique to autism emerged 
from this review of screening instruments, only traits that may be qualitatively and/or quantitatively 
different in autism and which may indicate autism when clustered together. There is no problem when 
people talk about the clustering of human traits indicative of autism, only if they imply that some 
traits are unique to autism. A screening tool can work well if it brings together a cluster of the traits 
associated with autism but that doesn't make any one of the traits in the tool an "autistic trait".  
Following on from this, there is no acceptable evidence for the existence of a "broader autism 
phenotype." (The view that “we're all on the spectrum somewhere" is wrong. The so-called broader 
phenotype is a chimera arising from one or both of two category mistakes: (1) reifying human traits, 
that when clustered together are indicative of someone being autistic, as “autistic traits”; and (2) 
regarding certain human traits as pathology in neurodivergent people but as difference in the rest of 




If a trait is unique to autism then it stands to reason that anyone with it must be autistic. But if that 
was the case, then diagnosis of autism would be a simple matter (Beardon, 2017), and the medical 
profession knows it is anything but simple. Medical professionals diagnose by looking for a cluster of 
human behavioural traits which appears to lead many of them, and others, into thinking that having 
some limited number of these traits implies a broader autism phenotype.   
 
The linguistic bewitchment that Ludwig Wittgenstein and other philosophers have cautioned against 
is at play here. Wittgenstein wrote: “The results of philosophy are the uncovering of one or another 
piece of plain nonsense and of bumps that the understanding has got by running its head up against 
the limits of language” (Wittgenstein, 1958: § 119). He was concerned about confusion caused by 
failing to spot nonsense in plain sight. In this case, “human traits indicative of autism” are mistakenly 
referred to as “autistic traits,” and then the simple fact that all human beings have human traits results 
in belief in a broader autism phenotype. Instead, many individuals who might currently be thought to 
be in a broader phenotype are in fact autistic, and the prevalence of autism is greater than most 
researchers think it is.    
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i It is a commonly held belief amongst clinicians that there is a genetic or developmental link between autism 
and anxiety, as some medical research appears to be suggesting (e.g., Parente et al., 2017). There is no proof yet 
as to the cause or causes of anxiety in autism. However, I suspect that neurotypical people would be the ones to 
suffer from high levels of anxiety if they were the 1-2% minority in an autistic world. 
ii Autism diagnoses in the diagnostic manuals have included Asperger’s disorder, autism spectrum disorder, 
autistic disorder, pervasive developmental disorder not otherwise specified (PDD-NOS), and Rett syndrome. 
Pathological demand avoidance (PDA) is the subject of debate as to whether or not it is part of the autism 
spectrum, and has not been included in either the DSM-5 or the ICD-11. 
iii We use identity-first language as it is generally preferred by autistic individuals (Kenny at al., 2016). 
iv The authors stress that a manual of neurodivergent needs should only be deployed if neurodivergent categories 
such as autism remained within the ambit of disability discrimination and support legislation. 
v Due to space restrictions, we have included extracts of the analysis in this article. The full analysis is available 
on request from Nick Chown (npchown@gmail.com).  
vi Dawson et al. (2002) defined the term “broader autism phenotype traits” which was presumably intended to 
amount to the same thing as “autistic traits.” 
vii See: https://www.wpspublish.com/store/Images/Downloads/Product/SCQ_Manual_Chapter_1.pdf 
viii The five factors are extroversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism and openness to experience. 
ix The author’s position is that autism is not a personality domain, rather that all human beings feature 
somewhere on an extroversion/introversion scale (for example), but not on an autism scale. However, cognitive 
and sensory differences in autism will affect the personality profile of autistic people. 
x As an unfunded independent researcher, the involvement of this group enabled the author to obtain autistic 
feedback efficiently. The group has to be kept secret as many members do not disclose being autistic for fear of 
the stigma attached to autism damaging their careers or future prospects. 
xi Definition of “autistic traits”: distinguishing features unique to autistic people i.e., excluding features 
qualitatively and/or quantitatively different in autism than in neurotypicality. 
xii For example, executive functioning (EF) deficits are seen in the early years, where they are developmentally 
appropriate, often return in old age, and are also associated with other neurological conditions. But this is not to 
say that EF deficits are normally distributed amongst the wider population. 
xiii
 Our adherence to the social model is apparent here, as our view is that there is no autism-friendly society in 
this neurotypical world.  
xiv The Cambridge University Autism Research Centre is the originator of the Autism Spectrum Quotient.  
xv We have received permission to reproduce questions from the Broad Autism Phenotype Questionnaire from 
Dr Joseph Piven of the University of North Carolina School of Medicine (personal communication, Joseph 
Priven, 22 February 2018).   
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xvi Autism-friendly versions of the three examples quoted here could read follows: “I can relate to the other 
person during conversation,” “I take time to get used to the idea of visiting an unfamiliar place,” and “People get 
frustrated by my unwillingness to compromise.” Use straightforward, non-figurative language. 
xvii The researcher has corresponded with the publishers of the SCQ about its use with adults. The initial 
question was: “we presume the authors would only recommend its use with adults with a severe comorbid 
intellectual disability.” Their response was: “The Lifetime Form … frames questions based on whether the 
behaviors have ever been present and/or if behaviors were present during the time period in which the individual 
was 4 to 5 years old.” The next question was: “The SCQ is described as being suitable for all autistic individuals 
above four years of age as long as their mental age exceeds two years. My interpretation of this, because there is 
no mention of an upper age limit, is that its designers consider it is appropriate for adults as well as for children. 
If this is the case then presumably it would be inappropriate for ‘high-functioning’ adults i.e. it would only be 
suitable for children and adults with a severe intellectual disability.” No response was received to this question. 
xviii Undertaken in connection with a doctoral thesis a few years ago. 
xix Asperger also recorded details of parents of the children he reported on in his original 1944 paper that may 
suggest that the parents were also autistic. For instance, he wrote that the father of Harro L. “was a strange man, 
and very similar to his son ... One could make out from what he said that he had nothing to do with anyone in 
the village where he lived and where he must have been considered highly eccentric. He said himself that he 
was nervous and highly strung but that ‘he controlled himself to such an extent that he appeared to be 
indifferent.’ In both the father’s and mother’s families there were said to be many highly strung people.” 
(Asperger, H. in: Frith, U. [Ed.] 1991: pp. 51-52).  
xx The kind of in-depth approach to getting to know their patients that Asperger’s team practised may be an 
improvement on a relatively short clinical assessment of behaviour (Silberman, 2015).  
